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Anne Meng presents a convincing case that autocratic leaders that are strong relative to 
other elites when achieving power can rule based on their own personal instincts. By 
contrast, if rival elites are strong relative to the leader, and pose a credible threat of a 
successful rebellion, leaders need to put constraints on their own power by institutional-
izing certain credible elements to guarantee regime accountability and future rents to 
these elites and thus assure their loyalty. These and other findings are based on analysis 
of governance data from 46 Sub-Saharan African countries starting from their respective 
year of independence or majority rule, up to 2010. Examples from other regions are also 
put forward and said to confirm the overall findings in Africa. 
Formal institutional measures that matter most are constitutional succession procedures, 
which are usually adopted within the first year of a leader’s term, and are typically not 
revoked. These are supported by informal power-sharing measures including the appoint-
ment of elite leaders to key positions such as Prime Minister, Vice President, and Minister 
of Defense, and reasonable stability of these appointments. Strong leaders include 
“founding fathers” that came to power in their newly independent nations on the back of 
popular social movements and wars of independence, leaders that achieved power by 
leading military coups, and leaders with access to oil rents. Weaker leaders include those 
that succeed strong ones and cannot live up to their stellar reputations. This group includes 
some designated successors that are selected because they are thought to be weak, and 
not to have the influence to depose the present leader. 
Meng goes on to determine whether institutionalized regimes perform better on key out-
comes. She finds that institutionalized regimes with constitutional succession rules and 
informal power-sharing with elites rule for longer periods of time with fewer coup at-
tempts, and are much more likely to achieve peaceful leadership successions. Term limits 
are much less important since they do not designate an heir apparent. 
Other scholars have tried to explain the persistence of authoritarian regimes by weak po-
litical parties, weak and coopted democracy, and other factors. A problem posed by these 
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approaches is that data often depends on expert judgments (e.g., How weak are the par-
ties? How coopted the democracy?) that are subjective. A strength of Meng’s approach 
is the use of relative objective measures (e.g., Is there a constitutional provision for suc-
cession? Are powerful elites serving in key, top level positions with reasonably stable 
tenure?). 
An important conclusion from Meng’s work is that democratic transitions are easily ex-
ploited and corrupted by autocratic leaders, and face high hurdles in being effective in 
constraining these leaders, while other measures such as succession rules and informal 
power-sharing have been successfully put in place to constrain authoritarian leaders in 
many tough-to-govern places. An important next step would be to investigate other pos-
sible benefits and tradeoffs of these institutionalized constraints on autocratic leaders. 
Does the increased political stability and reduced violence in these places lead to greater 
effectiveness in achieving sustainable development goals and other public goods? Is there 
some point in the development trajectory (e.g., middle-income trap?) where even a con-
strained autocracy is unable to deliver the goods? 
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